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From Bureaucracy to Enterprise? 
The Changing Jobs and Careers of Managers in Telecommunications Service 
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 In response to technological change and product market deregulation, longstanding U.S. telecommunications 
firms are radically restructuring their business strategies and organizations to improve competitiveness. While the 
popular and business press as well as academic researchers have focused attention on the dramatic changes occurring in 
the collapse of industry boundaries, megamergers, and the rise of new strategic alliances, they have largely ignored how 
these structural changes are profoundly altering the employment and careers of employees. In the Bell operating 
companies, where bureaucracy is seen as the major obstacle to competitiveness, managerial workers have become a 
significant target of reform because they are equated with bureaucracy and historically comprised approximately a 
quarter of the workforce. 
 This chapter analyzes how organizational restructuring is affecting managerial labor markets—the jobs, careers, 
and employment levels of line managers in Bell operating companies. It addresses a series of questions: How does 
organizational restructuring affect both employment levels and the nature of managerial work—the division of labor 
between the managerial and nonmanagerial workforce? How does it affect the career trajectories of lower and middle 
level managers? Are these changes leading to a loss of managerial power and a convergence in the working conditions 
of managerial and nonmanagerial workers? Or, conversely, do managers stand to gain from the flattening of hierarchies 
and devolution of decision making to lower organizational levels? Who wins and who loses in the process? Do new 
organizational cleavages and conflicts arise as a result? 
 The chapter’s central argument is that a new vision of organization has taken hold—one that replaces 
“bureaucracy” with “enterprise.” This vision is found both in management and academic literature and in corporate 
offices. But the vision entails sharp contradictions that have unintended consequences: new cleavages between lower 
and middle level managers on the one hand, and top managers on the other. The new vision relies on two competing 
approaches to
 organizational reform. The first approach begins with human resources and relies heavily on decentralizing management 
to lower levels. It draws on ideas from organizational behavior, strategic human resources management and industrial 
relations, and total quality. It views competitive advantage as emanating from entrepreneurialism and innovation at the 
point of customer contact. According to this logic, lower and middle managers have new, dynamic roles to play; their 
jobs must be redesigned to give them more opportunities to be creative and more autonomy to make decisions to meet 
customer needs. Supportive human resources practices include training in new skills (human resources management, 
business, marketing) as well as incentives (career opportunities, employment security, compensation) to inspire 
organizational commitment. The approach attempts to simulate small business enterprise in large firms. 
 The second approach begins with technology and engineering. It focuses on realizing scale economies through 
systemwide innovations. Organizational consolidations, new applications of technology, reengineering, and downsizing 
are all vehicles for enhancing efficiency and cutting costs. Rather than relying on decentralized discretion, this macro 
approach privileges the centralized decisions of top managers, consultants, and engineers—decisions that ripple through 
organizations to lower levels. Changes in the design of jobs and human resources practices flow as a consequence of 
new technologies and organizational restructuring. Because companies cannot make prior commitments to job 
enhancement or employment security, the two approaches are often in conflict. The central question is whether or how 
the two approaches can be reconciled. 
 In the case of the former Bell system companies since divestiture in 1984, the second logic has dominated the 
first for at least two reasons. First, top management views bureaucracy as the most serious obstacle to competitiveness 
(in contrast to manufacturing firms that view mass production modes as relics to be discarded). Second, advances in 
new digital and fiber optic technologies allow companies to reap even greater scale economies than they have in the 
past. The integrated nature or “systemness” of the telecommunications services industry makes centralization and 
consolidation an attractive approach to industrial organization. These centralized approaches have undermined the 
entrepreneurial and job enhancing approach to quality service that total quality theorists and others advocate. Top 
management has created contradictions for lower and middle managers along several dimensions. First, while new 
performance systems evaluate middle managers on the basis of broad customer service measures, top managers are 
judged by shareholders on the basis of narrower financial criteria. Second, while middle managers now have greater 
authority and responsibility for meeting performance goals, they lack the necessary control over budgets and 
operational decisions needed to get the job done—control that “real entrepreneurs” or owners of small businesses 
have. Third, they have heavier workloads with fewer financial or promotional rewards. Fourth, while their new role re-
quires increased discretionary effort, creativity, and commitment to the firm, firms have simultaneously decreased their 
long-term employment commitments to managers. In the past, the AT&T system created a seamless web of loyalty that 
rose through seven layers of management, with all employees unified around the goal of public service. In the present, 
the incentives and rewards for top management are at odds with those offered to lower level managers, who feel 
resentment and a sense of betrayal. 
 This argument draws on evidence from extensive qualitative held research and quantitative data collection in 
several regional Bell operating companies. It uses the results of a comprehensive survey conducted in 1994 of 330 lower 
and middle level line managers in one operating company. The survey asked employees how work organization and 
human resources practices were changing and how these changes affected their jobs and careers. 
This chapter reviews the dominant literature that has shaped the corporate thinking on restructuring and briefly 
describes the telecommunications industry context—the way the old system worked and how and why it is crumbling 
under the weight of technological change, national deregulation, and globalization of markets. The chapter also 
examines how changes in business strategy and structure at the firm level are reshaping the employment levels, jobs, 
and careers of lower and middle level line managers. 
Theoretical Perspectives 
 Two quite different views of the outcomes of corporate restructuring for managers have emerged in the last 
decade. On the one hand, the popular and business press provide numerous anecdotes of unemployed managers who 
are victims of corporate downsizing (Fisher, 1991; Cowan and Barron, 1992; Zachery, 1993). Researchers note the 
“collapse of internal labor markets” for managers and the growing similarity of employment conditions for managers 
and workers—for example, in the decline in managerial employment security. Researchers have also identified the loss 
of power and authority of supervisors when firms introduce employee participation or self-managing teams into 
production-level jobs (Klein, 1984; Schlesinger and Klein, 1987). 
 On the other hand, the same press carries images of the new manager, the “product champion” and innovator: 
 corporate restructuring gets rid of bureaucracy and frees up middle and lower level managers to be more 
entrepreneurial. Participatory management allows managers to gain from workers’ creativity; self- managed teams free 
up managers from administrative chores. These conflicting views also arise in different strands of the business school 
and academic literature. The arguments grow out of a rejection of bureaucratic organization and mass production as 
incongruent with global markets that demand low cost, high quality, reduced cycle time, flexibility, and innovation. 
The excellence literature, for example, argued for making all managers into entrepreneurs (Peters and Waterman, 1982; 
Peters and Austin, 1985; Peters, 1987). In stark contrast to the dominant literature of earlier periods that focused on top 
managers as the sole source of creativity and innovation (Barnard, 1946; Drucker, 1967; Mintzburg, 1973; Kotter, 1982), 
writers in the 1980s argued for loosely coupled organizations with “lean staff” that would create room for innovators 
across layers and departments of management. By recreating marketlike conditions inside large organizations, or “small 
in large organizations” (Drucker, 1988), managers would have greater incentives to initiate change and would take 
greater ownership over their productive units. The resource mobilization literature, spearheaded by Rosabeth Moss 
Kanter, went further in arguing that middle managers were the real source of innovation in large firms (1982a, 1982b, 
1983). New managerial ladders could provide greater opportunities—a shift from narrow, functionally based careers to a 
variety of ways of making it to the top (Kanter, 1984). 
 Another stream of literature, the strategic human resources management literature, called on management to 
link their business strategies and human resources strategies to improve performance (Tichy, Fombrun, and Devanna, 
1982; Beer, et al, 1985; Dyer, ed., 1988). Business school faculty and management consultants emphasized 
performance-enhancing human resources policies (training, participation, and compensation) (e.g., Lawler, 1986). While 
the “control to commitment” strategy (Walton, 1985) originally focused more on the nonmanagerial workforce, the 
ideas apply equally to the treatment of managers as employees. 
 Economists and compensation specialists developed a complementary argument in the “new economics of 
personnel” literature which called for “marketlike” pay systems in large firms to improve incentive structures. This 
involved reducing the percentage of fixed-base pay or salary while increasing at-risk pay and linking an individual’s pay 
to his or her contribution (pay-for-performance) (Gerhart, Milkovich, and Murray, 1992; Lazear, 1992; Shuster and 
Zingheim, 1992). 
 Industrial relations scholars additionally pointed to the need for middle managers to stop fighting over 
grievances and to learn to negotiate with union leaders in joint productivity-enhancing committees. Where unions 
existed, there was a greater likelihood of successful and broad-based adoption of performanceenhancing innovations by 
the workforce if union leaders embraced the experiments (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie, 1986). 
Reengineering and macrorestructuring approaches, by contrast, called for systemwide analysis of work processes and 
the elimination of all redundant work, no matter what the consequences for jobs and human resources practices (Ham-
mer and Champy, 1992). 
 Some argue that these alternative approaches provide a basis for a unified new vision of organization—from a 
“bureaucratic culture” to an “enterprise culture” in the firm (Ray, 1986). But researchers have rarely examined the vision 
in light of empirical reality—the competing claims that alternate approaches to reform make on managerial employees. 
As argued above, the reality of this change is often contradictory and may be summarized as follows. First, there should 
be fewer managerial jobs and opportunities for promotion. Second, the jobs that remain should be more interesting and 
challenging. Third, the ones that remain should be more contingent on productivity and accountability, offering less 
income and employment security. The scant empirical literature on the changing nature of managerial jobs and careers 
also suggests mixed results for firms and managers (See Fulop, 1991 for a review) as well as wide variation in the 
outcomes (Heckscher, 1995). Managerial jobs maybe more interesting, but there are fewer of them, and they no longer 
carry implicit long-term contracts and employment or income security. For managers, some may benefit and rise quickly; 
others may lose their jobs; others may both benefit and lose along different dimensions of their jobs and 
careers—having more powerful but more stressful jobs, more challenging but less stable careers. The challenge for 
empirical research is to untangle how these themes play out for differently situated managers—in different industries, 
corporate settings, managerial levels, functional areas, and professional occupations—distinctions that have rarely been 
made in the managerial literature. 
Managerial Jobs in Telecommunications Services: 1950-1980 
 The AT&T bureaucracy and the managerial jobs that occupied it grew dramatically between 1950 and 1980. 
Managerial jobs grew in absolute numbers by 50% between 1950 and 1960, by 60% between 1960 and 1970, and by 
47% between 1970 and 1980. By contrast, despite the overall expansion of the AT&T market, nonmanagerial jobs rose 
 by only 4.6% in the first decade, 23% in the second, and 2.7% in the third. Automation eliminated low-skilled work. The 
proportion of managers in the total AT&T workforce grew from 13.5% in 1950 to 29.4% in 1980. The ratio of all 
managers to all nonmanagers at AT&T was 1:6.3 in 1950 and 1:2.4 in 1980. Table 3-1 compares the relative growth of 
managerial and nonmanagerial jobs. 
 There are two probable explanations for this transformation. The most important concerns AT&T’s strategic 
response to increased regulatory oversight in the post-World War II period, which put pressure on the company to cut 
costs and reduce rates while expanding universal service. Regulators required detailed performance measurements and 
accountability. AT&T attempted to meet cost- minimization requirements through the logic of mass production: using 
electromechanical technology to reap scale economies, improve productivity, and lower costs in the provision of a high 
volume standardized product (voice transmission). But most jobs in telephone service were not susceptible to Taylorism 
or machine-pacing—only operator jobs were. By contrast, the network infrastructure or wireline required (and 
continues to require) a highly skilled and autonomous field staff; and the business office provided customized service 
through “universal service representatives” until the early 1980s. Those jobs that could not be machine-paced were 
heavily supervised, and this pattern is evident in the variation in spans of control for managers across occupational 
groups. In one representative Bell operating company, for example, by 1980 the ratio of first-line supervisors to workers 
was 1:6 in network crafts, 1:8-10 in customer services, and 1:20 in operator services. 
 A second factor contributing to the increase in managers was the growth of independent unionism and the 
threat of strikes in the post-World War II period, which led AT&T to seek ways of shifting work out of the bargaining unit 
to staff managers or “subject matter experts; this strategy has accelerated in the postdivestiture period, according to 
trade unionists. 
Despite the growth in bureaucracy, productivity in telecommunications services (measured as employees per 10,000 
access lines) grew by 5.9% per year between 1967 and 1988—over five times the average rate of 1.1% for the nonfarm 
business sector—and 10 times the rate of 0.8% in services (Waldstein, 1988, Table 4, U.S. Department of Labor, 
1990:10-12). 
 Managerial Jobs 
 In contrast to the literature on managerial labor markets that views the flexible deployment of managers as a 
raison d’etre for their employment security (Oster- man, 1988), most management jobs in the Bell system were highly 
regimented and functionally specialized. They resembled much more the Taylorism of industrial labor markets than the 
breadth commonly associated with managerial or salaried labor markets. There were seven layers of management 
leading up to officers in the operating companies and at AT&T. The primary role of supervisors and managers was to 
monitor and enforce work discipline. Standard operating procedures set at the top created relatively nonthinking 
managerial jobs that required implementing policies down the chain of command, enforcing discipline, and funneling 
numbers back up. The top-down, command and control management style at AT&T has led several observers to 
compare it to the military. For example: 
AT&T is to the Bell System what a general staff is to an army, and AT&T seems somewhat proud of the parallel. A company 
writer calls the military-modeled general staff “the greatest contribution to the art of management” of the first half of the 
twentieth century; pridefully he notes that AT&T adapted for its own use many of the staff concepts developed by Frederick 
the Great, Von Steuben, and Napoleon. . . . 
A traffic manager in the smallest of Bell offices reports to the traffic manager directly above him in the next largest office 
area to district to regional to operating company and ultimately to 195 Broadway [“AT&T’s Pentagon”]—just as an Army G-l 
officer has counterpart from battalion level all the way up to the Defense Department. . . . (Goulden, 1968, p. 17) 
AT&T transfers men as freely among the operating companies as the U.S. Army does among its divisions (Goulden, 1968, p. 
 22). 
 
 The military culture may also have been enhanced by AT&T’s frequent recruitment of veterans, a rich source of 
experienced people with radio, communications, and electronic skills. In addition, in the post-World War II period, 
management by numbers became the norm, and to many, an obsession. The Bell system measured the performance of 
managers as the aggregate of the performance of workers under them. If top management demanded better numbers, 
middle and lower managers felt squeezed and, in turn, pressured workers. 
 Detailed measurement systems were at least in part a response to federal and state regulators who increasingly 
sought to gain control over rates and service quality. State public utility commissions (PUCs), for example, set 
performance standards for network operations, from the length of time to repair a service outage to safety standards 
required during routine installation and repair. Each functional department in the telephone companies developed its 
own system of record keeping and internal performance measures as demanded by the state PUCs, and these measures 
were unique to the functional specialization of the department. The company tended to emphasize quantitative 
measures or output per unit input—tasks per day for network crews or seconds per call or callwaiting time for operators 
or customer service representatives. But PUCs also emphasized quality and service—in network, for example, the repair 
of service within a 24-hour period. Moreover, in the telephone service industry, quantity and quality of service are 
closely linked because good service is timely service. In customer services, for example, average waiting time is a key 
indicator of service quality because customers place heavy emphasis on quick response in judging service quality As one 
long-time manager in the Bell system commented, . . the telephone company has always been obsessed with quality, 
probably too much so. For example, we used to require that a customer call be answered in two rings. That was our own 
internal measure, but maybe we didn’t really need that—and it was expensive.” 
 The system of functionally specific measures reinforced separation and “turf” competition between managers in 
different departments. Maximizing efficiencies in one department, however, often undermined efficiencies in another. 
Maximizing tasks per day in network, for example, creates incentives for network craft workers to find quick fixes to 
problems; but such quick fixes may result in repeat calls for repair attendants and construction work to repair the 
deteriorated network. Functionally based measurement systems, therefore, created managers that were 
“efficiency-minded,” but narrow in perspective, and this often resulted in overall inefficiencies. As companies began to 
mechanize record keeping and measurement systems in the 1970s and 1980s, they simply computerized the 
inefficiencies in the old system. 
 Because the PUCs were so important in setting rate structures and performance requirements, the telephone 
companies geared their managerial structure towards meeting the demands of the PUC. The state telephone company 
president held the most important political position as an official reporting to the PUC. Regulatory was viewed internally 
as playing a public relations role, massaging the interface between the telephone company and the members of the PUC 
as well as state politicians who periodically voted on rate hikes. 
 AT&T’s concern for public image translated into a corporate emphasis on employee involvement in community 
service, such as for example, “The Pioneers,” which involved thousands of volunteers from Bell companies in community 
service activities. Employees were expected to play leadership roles in community organizations such as the Jaycees, and 
those who did so were looked on favorably for their leadership potential. 
A detailed account of AT&T’s attempts to manipulate public opinion in its favor traces the company policies to the 1910s 
and 1920s: 
Every employee in the Bell System is considered a potential public relations representative. Telephone company 
employees, as a class, are gracious and accommodating. This is no accident. The uniformity of behavior is the 
result of design. Employees are selected and trained by the company as public relations agents, because it is 
believed that through constant cultivation of public sympathy, telephone companies will have less trouble in 
getting increased rates and in opposing adverse legislation. (Danielian, 1939, p. 281)2 
  
 While this research captures the cynical side of AT&T’s manipulation of public perceptions, many employees 
took seriously their public service mission and participation in community affairs. For example, a study by Howard and 
Bray portrays telephone company managers as responsible public servants who took pride in their work. “Compared to 
managers in other organizations, they were more emotionally stable but less daring and more bound by rules. As 
managers of a government-controlled monopoly, they were less ‘dollar’ conscious in a proprietorship sense, but 
assumed social responsibility for the service the telephone business provided and had a real sense of obligation to the 
community” (Williams and Peterfreund, cited in Howard and Bray, 1988, p. 36). In a questionnaire administered by 
Howard and Bray, these managers consistently scored high in terms of their pride in their jobs and their overall job 
satisfaction (Howard and Bray, 1988, p. 132). 
 Internal Labor Markets 
 Internal labor markets in the Bell system—the formal and informal rules governing managers’ jobs and 
careers—reflected the company’s bureaucratic and functionally specialized organization. Career ladders were long and 
vertical. As early as 1910, AT&T began encouraging loyalty through “The American Plan,” (company-paid pensions, 
sickness and disability benefits, employee stock options, and an organization of retired and long-service employees). The 
company had seniority-based benefits and career ladders filled almost exclusively from within by the 1920s (Schacht, 
1985, p. 35-36). The Bell System recruited first level supervisors either from the rank and file or from the external labor 
market. Management positions above first level were filled exclusively from within. Managers received considerable 
training, much of which was designed to socially and psychologically separate them from workers. Those promoted from 
within were particularly encouraged to break all social ties with former coworkers. A former AT&T employee noted that 
people came into the system at a young age, received “heavy socialization” into their managerial role, and lost a sense 
of themselves in a system that demanded “total selfless loyalty.”3 
 Workers who were promoted from the ranks had at least a high school education and could expect to rise to 
lower or middle level management in their respective functional specialties: male network craft, female office workers 
in the business office or operator services. External recruits were usually college- educated, and tended to be placed in 
positions dispersed throughout the organization (Plant, Commercial, Engineering, Accounting, Traffic). They were ex-
pected to climb higher, and a select group was “fast-tracked” and chosen to be groomed for top management, which 
involved assignments across departments plus midcareer training or executive development courses. The Bell System 
provided generous educational allowances and tuition aid for college courses and beyond, and many employees availed 
themselves of these opportunities in order to gain promotions. 
 In their longitudinal study of AT&T, managers Howard and Bray (1988) document the advancement of college- 
and non-college-educated males through management ranks from 1956 to 1976. The modal level of achievement for 
noncollege-educated managers was a level two management position, while that of college-educated managers was 
level three. In Howard and Bray’s sample of 422 managers (274 college and 148 non-college-educated), between 5% and 
10% of non-college-educated workers were promoted each year (depending on the year). By contrast, between 15% and 
25% of college-educated managers received promotions in the same period (Howard and Bray 1988, p. 128-129). 
Most careers in the Bell system, however, did not resemble a professional development track. Workers were promoted 
from within because as supervisors, they had an intimate knowledge of the technology and job requirements—of which 
standard operating procedures were important, for example, and which were obstacles to getting the job done. Most 
managers capitalized on job specific formal and informal knowledge, living out their careers in the same department or 
subdepartment. In this setting, informal sponsorship or paternalism was extremely important for ensuring movement up 
the ranks. If a subordinate was particularly skilled and reliable, this sponsorship not only facilitated upward movement, 
but discouraged lateral mobility. Some employees say that “good performers” were penalized and became “stuck” 
because superiors depended on them. 
 What is significant about this portrait is that once divestiture and downsizing began, managers with long 
histories in the Bell system and deep, functionally specific knowledge had few occupational alternatives outside of the 
system. The skills and knowledge accrued in a Bell system “career” were not portable. Those who left the system often 
retired and/or retrained for entirely new occupations. 
 In summary, managerial lives in the Bell system were a mixed blessing. Jobs were regimented and relatively 
uncreative, but had an important public service mission. The system clearly created middle-class jobs and management 
opportunities that otherwise would not have been available for a population dispersed in small towns, cities, and rural 
areas across the country. The system provided lifetime employment security unlike that provided by other large 
corporations because AT&T had a guaranteed rate of return and was not seriously affected by business cycle 
fluctuations. 
Technology Change, Deregulation, and Restructuring: 1980-1994 
 At divestiture in 1984, the Modified Final Judgement (MFJ) allowed AT&T to participate in deregulated 
equipment and long distance markets, but divested AT&T of its 22 local telephone companies that were consolidated 
into the current seven regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs) and that retained their monopoly position in local 
services. AT&T downsized rapidly, eliminating over one- third of its domestic workforce in the first six years following 
divestiture but expanding the relative proportion of managers to 54% (Keefe and Batt, 1996). It restructured into 
business units based on market segments, invested heavily in new digital technologies, and began implementing total 
quality management. Employee morale plummeted (Keefe and Batt, 1996). 
  The regional Bell companies moved more slowly, reducing the workforce by attrition, and investing in those 
unregulated markets that the MFJ allowed—such as information services, cellular, and international services. Cost 
pressures on phone companies increased from the late 1980s on, however, as local access carriers (LACs) such as 
Metrofiber and Teleport constructed local fiber loops in metropolitan areas and skimmed the more lucrative business 
customers. Large institutions, such as schools, hospitals, universities, and utilities, developed their own private networks 
and reduced reliance on phone companies. And cable companies, wired to roughly 65% of households nationally, were 
perched to enter the local residential market as soon as legislation permitted. The anticipated deregulation of local 
services in the 1990s led the RBOCs to accelerate their efforts to cut costs through consolidations, downsizing, and 
reengineering of business processes. The 1996 Telecommunications Act deregulated all markets, so that long distance 
companies, cable companies, and other carriers could provide local services and the Bell companies could enter long 
distance. 
 The resulting changes in business strategy and structure in the regional Bell companies are summarized and 
presented in Table 3-2. First, companies shifted from a public service mission shaped by engineers and regulators to a 
sales- maximizing mentality shaped by finance and marketing departments, and oriented toward Wall Street. Second 
they shifted from a standardized high-volume product market (voice) to a differentiated product market (voice, 
enhanced services such as voice messaging, data, video, image). To support this shift, they invested heavily in fiber cable 
and broadband integrated services digital networks (ISDN) to allow them to carry high speed data, voice, video, and 
imaging and remain technologically competitive. 
  
 To respond to new competitive conditions, Bell operating companies developed organizational strategies that 
have the unintended consequence of sending contradictory messages to employees. On the one hand, micro level 
experiments are designed to increase employee participation and decentralize decision making so that employees can 
improve customer service. On the other hand, macro strategies that centralize decision making, streamline the 
organization, and reduce costs dominate and often undermine local initiatives. While companies reengineer and 
downsize to eliminate bureaucracy, they request increased employee commitment and discretionary effort to enhance 
service quality. Managers on the regulated side complain that they are asked to do more with less, while they observe 
companies shifting resources to expand their activities in lucrative nonregulated markets such as information services, 
cellular, and international services. 
 Similarly, companies are centralizing some functions while decentralizing others. On the side of centralization, 
companies are taking advantage of scale economies to consolidate and standardize operations at the regional level 
(from what was the state or local telephone level). Additionally, they have created regional business units defined by 
market segment (residential, small business, large business). The difficulty with the business unit structure in 
telecommunications is that the network infrastructure serves all segments; critical decisions regarding choice of 
technology and operational standards that would be controlled by the business unit in most other industries are under a 
 separate regional entity because of the “systemness” or integrated nature of the network. 
 At the same time that companies have created regional corporate entities and regional business units defined by 
market segment, they are attempting to decentralize decisions regarding customer service, quality, and work 
organization to the local or “district” level (analogous to a plant in manufacturing). This idea comes from quality and 
excellence theorists that “empowering” managers to “get close to the customer” is the key to continuous improvement 
in service quality. 
 In summary, the direction of change is to hollow out the old state telephone companies, with key operational 
decisions shifting either up to the regional corporate or business unit entity or down to the “district” or local managerial 
level. This has created tensions between local and regional, lower and top level managers over operational decisions. 
Implications for Managerial Jobs 
 The implications of these changes in business strategy and structure for lower and middle level managers can 
best be understood through a detailed study of one representative Bell operating company that draws on qualitative 
and survey data. Since the early 1980s, this company like other Bell companies began experimenting with participatory 
management practices, beginning with the union- management Quality of Worklife (QWL) program in 1980 that sought 
to do away with AT&T’s traditional military command and control approach. The changes for managers stressed new 
behaviors rather than new skills in the technical sense of the term. Management training emphasized a “softer” 
approach, listening rather than dictating skills. Managers had to learn to discuss and negotiate with employees and 
union leaders over problems as they arose, rather than only in the context of grievances. In the course of the 1980s, the 
QWL program grew and gave way to more extensive employee involvement, and later a total quality program in which 
lower-level managers tapped the ideas of workers to improve customer service. In the mid-1980s, the company began 
experimenting with the use of self-managed teams (SMTs) as a next step in managers “letting-go;” where teams were 
introduced, a first-line supervisor now had the role of “coach” and was supposed to lead rather than command, inspire 
rather than demand obedience. 
 At the same time that participatory experiments were occurring, the company was centralizing, consolidating, 
and downsizing. Between 1984 and 1990 the company consolidated the old telephone companies into one regional 
entity, merging executive positions, human resources, regulatory, labor relations, and finance into one corporate 
organization and standardizing the network technology across the region. Overall workforce reductions of 25% occurred 
through attrition and an early retirement buyout for managers. Serious efforts to cut the managerial force began in the 
1990s, leading to a reduction of 23.5% of managers by 1993. Approximately 50% left through early retirement buyouts, 
another 40% through transfers to other subsidiaries, and another 10% by other programs to provide early exit or 
extended leaves. These voluntary reductions rippled through the organization, leaving random holes in staffing levels. 
While the company surpassed its goal for reducing management ranks, at least some managerial positions were 
subsequently refilled by promoting non- managerial workers into lower-level management positions. By 1993, when top 
management decided that downsizing was not occurring at a quick enough pace (line and staff managers still comprised 
24.5% of the workforce, and the ratio of first-line supervisors to workers was 1:5.9), the company announced an across- 
the-board 10% downsizing, forcing involuntary separations among managers and attrition among nonmanagers. At least 
one out of seven management levels was to be eliminated. The forced reductions broke with the company’s tradition of 
employment security and sent shock waves through the organization. The company announced an additional downsizing 
in 1995—96. 
 Across the Bell companies, interest in self-managed teams has often focused on their importance as a vehicle for 
downsizing. With roughly 50% of management staff at the first-line supervisor level, companies view self-managed 
teams as vehicle for dramatically cutting indirect labor costs. Managers in different companies have expressed similar 
experiences: “We lost so many management jobs that they backed into it [SMTs]”; or “This experiment [SMTs] was 
viewed as ‘my toy.’ Now that we’re downsizing, it’s being taken seriously.” In another company, a network supervisor 
said the objective was “. . . increased span of control. Traditionally in my area it was 1:5. The company wants to go to 
1:30. There’s no way to supervise this many, so the duties of the supervisor have to change.” The change to 
self-managed teams is also facilitated through new technologies that electronically monitor the flow of work. This is true 
not only in services where information systems track the call handling of operators and customer service 
representatives, but in network where handheld computers now allow field technicians to record work as they complete 
it. 
 Supervisors who have learned to become coaches appear to like the job better because they are freed up to get 
out in the field more and do less paperwork. Because their work involves more coordination and less direct disciplining 
 and supervision, their jobs look more like those of middle managers, and in this sense they are enhanced. By contrast, 
first-line supervisors who continue with traditional responsibilities express frustration over their jobs because 
administrative tasks are heavy and downsizing has led workloads to increase. A company- sponsored survey of network 
supervisors found that only one-third of respondents were satisfied with their jobs; another one-third said they would 
return to craft jobs if given the opportunity. But even among supervisors who have at least some self-managed teams 
under their jurisdiction, the workloads appear daunting. According to one such supervisor, “My span of control has 
tripled ... I work 14 hours a day, five days a week. . . . I’m fully accountable if anything goes wrong. Supervisors now 
spend 60% of their time doing paperwork. High stress. Performance is slipping some. We used to make two or three 
visits a day to each worker. You’d go out and find out how he’s doing. Now I see each worker once a week.” 
 The company in this case study used the experience from self-managed teams to redesign supervisors’ jobs and 
reduce their administrative work from roughly 60% of their time to 10%. Under the piloted job redesign, coaches would 
spend 50% of their time in the held training and developing workers. The job redesign was not implemented, however, 
because of more macrolevel organizational restructuring. 
 In the survey conducted for this study, despite the fact that SMTs are clearly equated with fewer supervisor jobs, 
there was surprisingly broad-based support for the idea.4 Sixty-eight percent of all network managers and 85% of 
customer services managers supported their use. Moreover, the support was higher among hrstline supervisors (71%) 
who, according to conventional literature should have the most to lose, than middle managers (57%).5 Regardless of 
whether managers had direct experience with these teams or not, approximately three-quarters saw the benefit to 
teams in the increased cooperation and sense of ownership over work that members have. 
 For middle level managers responsible for local or district level operations, the company used total quality 
concepts to create small, cross-functional business units known as “district operations councils,” in contrast to the past 
when middle managers had little discretion and reported through department hierarchies to state-level officials. The 
district operations councils, local geographic units established at divestiture and made up of local managers from 
different departments, had functioned in the 1980s primarily as vehicles for public relations, employee involvement in 
community affairs, and the telephone company’s interface with the regulatory environment. Local managers maintained 
departmental turf and interacted little beyond monthly council meetings. Under the total quality program, the new role 
for the district operations councils is to improve service quality, maximize revenues, and control costs. Legislative and 
regulatory concerns became secondary; coordination of community activities was discontinued. Councils took 
responsibility for initiating quality action teams to solve particular problems or initiate workplace innovations such as 
self-managed teams. Newly revised customer service reports provided data at the local level, rather than at the state 
level as had previously occurred. While the district operations councils still do not constitute profit centers, they come 
much closer to the concept of cost centers than historically. 
 Conceptually, this reform represents a change not only from centralized to decentralized, and functional to 
more collaborative ways of operating, but from a focus on public service to individual customer service, from actions 
such as community service that present the collective face of the company, to actions designed to respond to individual 
customer service requirements or complaints. For middle managers, this requires a shift in skills away from the 
regulatory environment and toward business, marketing, and human resources management. More importantly, some 
managers believe the new mission runs counter to the moral and ethical principles on which their public service careers 
were built. This reaction was evident in qualitative interviews with managers as well as in their survey responses; for 
example, while 86% of all managers said their work gave them a sense of accomplishment, only 40% agreed with top 
management’s strategic direction for the company; and only 29% said that their values were similar to those of the 
company. 
 Another dimension of change was the inclusion of local union presidents in the district operations councils. In 
order to gain union support for the quality program, top management negotiated a multitiered partnership structure 
with the regional union leadership, and then mandated that all middle managers should work with their local union 
counterparts. This design was to overcome the historic problem that one top manager described, “We always seem to 
jump over the middle manager.” While some local presidents had begun participating in that portion of the council 
meetings pertaining to the joint Quality of Worklife program, the new mandate was for them to participate in the 
regular monthly business meetings of the district council. 
 The responses of middle and lower level managers to survey questions concerning the changing nature of their 
jobs and skills is consistent with much of the above description of organizational change6 (see Table 3-3). The overall 
picture that emerges from survey data is of managers in the midst of a transition to a more decentralized and 
 participatory culture along some dimensions of work, but constrained and frustrated by top management decisions with 
respect to cost cutting and downsizing. 
 Ninety-three percent of all managers said the skills needed for their jobs were changing, but the kinds of new 
skills varied significantly by managerial level. Over 60% of lower-level managers in customer services cited technical 
(computer) skills as the most important new ones, whereas 75% of middle managers cited “soft” skills in leadership, 
general management, quality, and labor relations. The pattern was similar but less pronounced in network, where 53% 
of lower managers ranked new technical skills in first place and 60% of middle managers ranked soft skills as the critical 
new ones.7 
 With respect to the decentralization of decision making, the evidence shows that middle and lower level 
managers are experiencing more discretion, but diffusion is uneven. On the one hand, over 55% of all managers said 
that their discretion to make decisions to meet customer needs had increased in the last two years; and consistent with 
this pattern, a substantial minority (47% of network and 42% of customer services) said that the amount of supervision 
they receive had decreased in the same period. On the other hand, a majority (53%) also said that bureaucratic rules and 
procedures continued frequently to obstruct their ability to meet customer needs. Moreover, with respect to changes in 
control over tasks and work pace, responses were relatively evenly divided between those who experienced greater 
control, less control, and no change. 
 Surprisingly, however, and contrary to the image that exists of managers in a large bureaucracy with little 
discretion over their jobs, 59% of all managers said they had complete or “a lot” of control over the tasks, procedures, 
and pace of their work, and these responses did not vary significantly by department. This is surprising because 
historically customer service jobs are viewed as more con strained and easily regulated than network jobs that are more 
widely decentralized and require flexibility to respond to the local outside network environment. While this difference 
may exist among frontline workers, it does not seem to carry over into lower and middle level managerial jobs. 
 
  The evolution of a more participatory culture is also evident: three-quarters of the managers surveyed had 
participated in at least one form of collaborative or problem-solving team: quality action, QWL, cross-functional, or 
problem-solving team; 10% had participated in all four. Participation, however, increased by management level, even 
after controlling for tenure. In other words, although there is a growing collaborative or participative culture, it is more 
available to those higher up in management. These patterns did not vary significantly by department. The differences in 
participation rates across levels of management are reflected in different levels of satisfaction expressed by managers 
concerning their involvement in decision making: whereas 72% of middle managers in network were satisfied with their 
participation, only 55% of lower managers were satisfied. The pattern is similar in customer services, although the 
overall rates of satisfaction are higher. In sum, managers show great interest in increased decision-making responsibility. 
 They are also highly supportive of the new partnership with the union, contrary to the conventional wisdom 
concerning middle management resistance to labor-management participation. Ninety-two percent of all managers said 
they supported union participation in total quality, 86% said it was critical to the success of total quality, and 75% said it 
was necessary for the success of self- managed teams. Over 90% of district managers said that local union presidents 
participated in monthly district council meetings; and 53% also invited them to regular staff meetings. 
Among middle-level managers at the district level, evidence of increased discretion is mixed. On the one hand, they 
indicate they have considerable (complete or a lot of) control over decisions regarding quality (82%), human resources 
practices such as training beyond what is required by the company (64%), and industrial relations (76%). A majority 
(60%) say that their control over quality has increased over the last two years, and a substantial minority (47%) also note 
an increase in their authority over labor relations matters. On the other hand, in network where district-level managers 
are responsible for managing their capital budget, the majority (57%) say they have only some or little control over 
these budgets and 57% say that this control has declined in the last two years. Many of these managers experienced 
cuts in their capital and training budgets in 1993 and 1994. Some are resentful and view their budget cuts as financing 
investments on the nonregulated side of the business. 
 For the majority of managers at all levels, downsizing has had a significant effect on workloads and staffing 
levels. Ninety-three percent of all managers said their workload had increased over the last two years, and this response 
did not vary significantly by department or managerial level. Sixty-three percent of all managers (68% of network and 
 52% of customer services) said they worked 10 hours or more each day, and over 60% said they had more overtime or 
take-home work than they wanted. Sixty percent (64% in network and 51% in customer services) said they were always 
or quite frequently understaffed. These higher workloads are reflected in increased spans of control. Seventy-two 
percent of all managers say that their span of control has increased, with a significantly greater percentage (82%) in 
customer services than in network (67%). Almost 40% of those with enlarged spans of control now supervise 3 to 5 
additional workers; another 37% manage between 6 and 15 additional workers. Traditionally, the standard size of work 
groups in network was 6 workers, and in customer services, 10 (see Table 3-4). 
Changing Internal Labor Markets 
 Downsizing has also, at least during this period of transition, reduced overall mobility throughout management. 
Although job ladders on paper have not changed, movement has halted. In 1990, for example, approximately 5% of 
managers were promoted to higher pay grades, a fraction of what existed in the 1950s through 1970s when Howard and 
Bray did their study. Moreover, approximately the same number of managers were promoted in 1990 as in 1991-93 
combined; and the very small number of new managers hired from the outside in 1990 was still over twice the 
combined total of new hires for 1991-93. Gender- based occupational segregation has historically reduced lateral 
mobility and continues to do so: while 31% of the managers in the sample were female, they were concentrated in 
customer services (71% female) and underrepresented in network (14%). 
 Interviews with managers indicate that downsizing also reduces requests for lateral transfers: managers don’t 
want to risk losing their “sponsorship” and joining a new department where they will be the new person, a relative 
unknown to a new supervisor who will evaluate them. Interviewees also related stories of managers reluctant to take 
advantage of opportunities for midcareer educational programs or international experience for fear that (“out of sight, 
out of mind”) their departments would have learned that they were dispensable, their jobs would have been eliminated, 
and they would face less attractive job prospects or the necessity to relocate in order to have a job at all. In response to 
survey questions, 92% of managers said job security had decreased, 89% said that opportunities for promotion had 
declined, 80% said that opportunities for mobility had decreased. A large minority (38%) said they had had to relocate in 
the past three years as a result of organizational restructuring. 
 Finally, the company introduced a new managerial performance evaluation and compensation system that ties 
 jobs more closely to external market conditions and links pay to performance. It reduces managerial job classifications 
from 3,600 to 2,000, largely by eliminating departmental distinctions and creating short descriptions of broad 
responsibilities rather than detailed lists of specific tasks. The new compensation plan shifts from a salary-based plan 
built around internal equity to a variable-based system linked more closely to the external market. Rather than moving 
to broadbanding with a number of gradations in each band, the company expanded the number of pay grades from 
eight to 15, a change that allows the company to more accurately link internal rates with external variation. To promote 
pay-for-performance, the company moved from more or less across-the-board increases to a forced distribution system. 
In the past, virtually all managers received a top rating in a three-point scale and, therefore, gained the maximum 
amount in annual pay raises available. Under the new system, managers receive between 80% and 120% of their grade, 
but a forced distribution means that supervisors will be forced to differentiate more between high and low performers 
among their subordinates. In addition, 10% of 
 
salary continues to be at risk (an innovation since divestiture), with group payouts dependent on financial and service 
performance. 
 In summary, managers show mixed reactions to the dramatic changes in their jobs and careers. While they like 
 their jobs and the opportunity for greater participation in decision making, they are highly dissatisfied with opportunities 
for advancement and corporate leadership more generally. Whereas less than 20% are satisfied with their employment 
security or opportunities for advancement, 78% are satisfied with their jobs and 68% with their participation in 
decisions. They appear to be a hard-working and reliable workforce. Eighty-four percent reported having zero absences 
in 1993. Most score high on commitment variables: 61% say they are willing to work harder for the company, 60% say 
they are proud to work for the company, and 56% say they are loyal. By contrast, they see a gap between themselves 
and top management. Only 31% agree with top management’s resource allocation decisions, only 29% believe top 
management is committed to quality, and only 19% think that top management considers employee interests in making 
organizational decisions. In other words, while they feel committed to the organization, they are critical of top 
management’s commitment to them (see Table 3-5). 
Conclusions: Implications for Internal Labor Market Theory 
 Managers in the old Bell system grew up in internal labor markets that closely resembled the classic industrial 
ladders described by Doeringer and Piore (1971). Companies are in the midst of redefining those markets to simulate 
external market like conditions in an enterprise culture. A useful framework for comparing the past and future models is 
along four critical dimensions: job definition, deployment, employment security, and wage rules (Osterman, 1987, 
1988). This comparison is outlined in Table 3-6. In the past, jobs were defined narrowly and functionally; managers had a 
small span of control and limited discretion. Technical skills were emphasized, and lower and middle level managerial 
jobs focused heavily on monitoring workers and reporting up the chain of command. A commitment to internal 
recruitment shaped deployment strategies, and vertical mobility was high: nonmanagerial workers could aspire to lower 
and middle level positions; college-educated recruits to first-level supervisory positions could count on long careers in 
middle and top management. Company-provided training was of high quality, and company-paid tuition supported 
college education for managerial advancement. Wages and benefits were generous. 
 Under the new system, lower and middle level managerial jobs are broader, focused on providing quality 
service, and intended to involve more crossfunctional collaboration. Spans of control are double or triple what they 
were in the past, allowing managers less time for traditional supervisory tasks. While self- managed teams absorb some 
supervisory functions, electronic tracking replaces manual reporting. The evolution to a new coordinating or coaching 
 role has been identified as a significant change by researchers studying firstline supervisors in other contexts (Manz and 
Sims, 1987; Schlesinger and Klein, 1987; Klein, 1988). In this sense, the job of first-line supervisors stands to be 
enhanced, but the ranks will be pared down. For middle managers, greater discretion is occurring in some areas (notably 
in customer service, quality, human resources management, and industrial relations), but not others (control over 
resource allocation). 
 
  
 Training systems for managers, already quite developed and well funded in the old Bell system, do not appear to 
be undergoing dramatic change. Changes appear to be more in the thrust of training in new areas such as knowledge of 
business, marketing, and the industry; and management and leadership skills. There are much greater changes in 
deployment: in the greater use of external recruitment for middle and upper management positions and in the decline 
in vertical mobility. While the notion exists that more lateral mobility will occur across the organization, current 
downsizing has dampened most movement overall, and it is unclear how long this will continue. The radical departure 
 from the past is in what may be termed “forced lateral movement”—either due to consolidations and relocations of 
offices or transfers to other nonregulated growth subsidiaries as a means of ensuring continued employment. Continuity 
with the past exists in continued high levels of occupational segregation by gender. Employment security is now 
contingent on skill and performance- wage rules cream variable rather than fixed pay and income security. 
 What is the significance of these changes for firms and managers? Do these new practices achieve the goal of 
creating an enterprise culture that is more suited to new competitive markets? The long, vertical career ladders of the 
past created two central benefits: first, they preserved the skill base in the industry through continuity in the training 
and development of technicians and professionals; second, they built loyalty and commitment through job and income 
security. They sacrificed creativity and breadth. Companies are attempting to undo the worst excesses of bureaucratic 
behavior by altering internal labor market rules to favor an enterprise culture. While gaining participation they may be 
losing the goodwill of managers. 
 One of the effects of the new enterprise culture is to create a new cleavage— between lower and middle 
managers on the one hand and top management on the other. Other researchers have noted the contradiction in 
constraints imposed by top management in the context of also promoting “entrepreneurialism" (Donaldson, 1985). 
Researchers studying the restructuring of British Telecom also found evidence of this contradiction: the devolution of 
authority to middle managers turned out to be more rhetoric than reality and created high expectations among middle 
managers who were subsequently demoralized when the reality turned out to be far less than that promised (Colling 
and Ferner, 1992). Middle managers in the old Bell system companies talk openly of their resentment toward top 
management—who on the one hand ask middle managers to be more committed and creative than ever in improving 
quality and customer service; but on the other hand, who cut the resources needed for these managers to accomplish 
this goal. On the one hand, middle managers say they are told they have new power to make quality improvements in 
work processes; on the other hand, companywide reengineering teams announce process changes without the input of 
middle and lower managers. On the one hand, middle managers are told to create an ongoing learning organization; on 
the other hand, they have no certainty that they will lead those organizations in the near future. 
 The extent to which these contradictions undermine quality improvements or firm competitiveness remains to 
be seen, as does the extent of change in internal labor markets that actually occurs. While company policies governing 
 internal labor markets have changed, actual changes in practice are lagging. The regional Bell companies, for example, 
have been slow to implement forced separations even when they have been officially announced. While external 
recruitment is occurring to a greater extent than in the past, these companies will maintain a strong commitment to 
internal promotions. While new performance management systems have been announced, the systems of the past were 
intended to differentiate “higher” and “lower” performing employees, but as implemented did not. Changes in job 
design and human resources policies are difficult to implement because their implementation often depends on 
managers who stand to lose in the process. Thus, this study captures organizations in the midst of transition, but the end 
point is still unclear; and it may fall far short of the lean and nimble entrepreneurial player that is envisioned in current 
management theory. 
Notes 
This chapter was prepared for the Conference on the Changing Careers of Managers, Sloan School, MIT, July 20-21, 
1994. 
1. Interview with labor relations manager, regional Bell operating company, August 11, 1993. 
2. Company-paid dues to such organizations totaled $4.8 million between 1924 and 1935 (Danielian, 1939, p. 284). 
In a speech at a Bell system conference in 1921, for example, then president of AT&T Thayer stated: 
“Membership in such organizations as the United States Chamber of Commerce, National Labor Organizations 
and National Farmers Organizations, etc., local Chambers of Commerce, Rotary Clubs, etc., and civic organiza-
tions of every description, improvement societies, neighborhood groups, church clubs, consumers’ leagues, etc. 
afford unusual opportunities for establishing contacts with the leaders in general public activities and those who 
are molding public sentiment” (Danielian, 1939, p. 285-286). 
3. Jeff Keefe, personal communication, August 15, 1994. 
4. It should be noted that this survey was conducted in 1994 when “involuntary separations” of managers had been 
announced, but not yet implemented. Anecdotal evidence in 1996, with the company in the midst of major 
downsizing and reorganization, suggests that managers’ attitudes have deteriorated significantly. 
5. Comparing managers who do and do not have direct experience with self- managed teams, 90% of those with 
 experience supported their use; but even among those without experience, 51% favored them. Asked directly 
whether self-managed teams undermine the authority of firstline supervisors, 70% of those with experience said 
rarely or never, compared to 45% of the managers of traditional groups. 
6. The data in Tables 3-3, 3-4, and 3-5 consist of 331 line managers in two core departments—network and 
customer services. About two-thirds of the respondents are from network and one-third from customer 
services, reflecting the relative size of the workforce in each of these departments. The survey asked three levels 
of managers in each department (middle, lower middle, and first line) a series of questions concerning changes 
in the job characteristics, skill requirements, work organization, and human resources practices in the firm. 
7. Surprisingly, over 50% of managers said that opportunities for training had not changed, and over 70% said that 
more training was not a high priority; most managers responded that their training was adequate. Two 
interpretations are plausible: this may reflect the fact that the old Bell system companies have historically 
invested heavily in training (historically 3.5% of payroll in this company); alternatively, it may be that managers 
are reluctant to admit their skill deficiencies. 
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